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THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
SUPERFUND ENFORCEMENT
Heidi Wilson Abbott
The use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in
environmental law has been the subject of much discussion and
controversy in the last decade. The rise of ADR reflects a need for
alternatives to traditional litigation and settlement techniques in
environmental law.
1
Advocates of alternative dispute resolution assert that ADR is
more effective and less costly than traditional litigation in achieving
a fair and efficient resolution to environmental problems. Unlike the
often hostile and adversarial nature of many environmental disputes,
proponents assert that ADR encourages trust and good-faith
bargaining between parties; as a result, ADR provides the potential
for both sides to achieve a mutually beneficial agreement. Critics
have suggested, however, that ADR resolves important public issues
by private agreement and circumvents public forums such as the
courts.
ADR techniques have been used with some success in
Superfund enforcement cases. Currently, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is statutorily obligated to have initiated
cleanups at 375 hazardous waste sites by October 1991.2 This is a
small fraction of the 1,187 hazardous waste sites designated for
cleanup on the National Priority List (NPL).3 Negotiating these
cleanups imposes a major burden on the EPA and ultimately on the
courts. As a result, proponents of ADR suggest that in many
1. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema? 99 HARV.
L. REV. 668 (1986). "At worst, ADR is merely a highly fashionable idea, now
viewed as worthy of serious discussions among practitioners and scholars of
widely diverse backgrounds and professional interests. At best, the ADR
movement reflects a serious new effort to design workable and fair alternatives
to our traditional judicial systems." Id. at 668.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9616(e) (1988).
3. 55 Fed. Reg. 35,502 (1990).
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situations it is in the best interests of the EPA and the potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) to work out settlements for the cost of
these cleanups through mediation and negotiation. ADR can also be
used among the PRPs themselves to apportion liability for their
respective contributions to a cleanup.
This article analyzes the use of alternative dispute resolution
in Superfund enforcement cases. The article focuses on the
utilization of ADR in negotiating cleanup settlements between the
EPA and the PRPs, as well as on negotiations between PRPs
themselves for contribution.!
OVERVIEW OF ADR AND ITS ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Alternative dispute resolution is an umbrella for several very
different methods of resolving disputes, including mediation,
arbitration, fact-finding, and mini-trials.5
Mediation
Mediation is the practice of using a neutral third party to
facilitate a mutually agreeable settlement. Although the results are
non-binding, mediation provides parties with an opportunity to
approach their differences in a voluntary, informal manner. 6 Non-
binding mediation or negotiation has been attempted in almost every
Superfund case in an effort to reach a consensus among the PRPs on
issues such as "liability concerns, allocation of cleanup costs, and site
4. Participation by state and local governments and citizen groups is essential
to any effective cleanup action for both theoretical and practical reasons. This is
an enormous topic in itself, however, and will not be considered in this paper.
5. See Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in
Enforcement Actions (EPA, Aug. 6, 1987), 18 Envtl. L. Rep. Admin. Materials
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 35123 (Jan. 1988).
6. Id. at 35124.
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remediation alternatives."7
In the Pollution Abatement Services case,' a mediation team
sought to facilitate agreement by organizing and summarizing
numerous documents which described how a variety of wastes had
been handled and disposed. The mediators also summarized
documents containing detailed descriptions of the transactions
between the owner-operator and various generators, transporters, and
middlemen.9 The documents were then analyzed to identify who
sent what wastes to the site, which in turn provided a basis for
determining cost allocation. This process resulted in the identification
of approximately twenty new PRPs, bringing the total number of
PRPs to over one hundred. Mediation of the $12 million cost
recovery action resulted in a consent decree which was signed by all
but one party.1
Mediation, through a court-appointed Special Master, has also
been used to resolve complex technical issues such as determining
what constitutes a "hazardous substance."11 In a case discussed in an
article by Lawrence Susskind, which did not involve Superfund but
may be analogized to apply to Superfund cases, a Special Master
was appointed to estimate the cost per household for a regional
sewage system and to assess risk management problems in running
7. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially Responsible
Parties: The Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10158
(May 1988).
8. United States v. Pollution Abatement Services of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133
(2d Cir. 1985). See also PAS Oswego, N.Y. EPA ROD Issues Abstract at 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. Admin. Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 30012 (Aug. 1985).
9. Rennie, Kindling the Environmental ADR Flame: Use of Mediation and
Arbitration in Federal Planning, Permitting, and Enforcement, 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10479 (Nov. 1989).
10. Id.
11. Cohen, supra note 7.
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sewage treatment plants.12 Such mediation through a Special Master
is useful to courts which may be reluctant or ill equipped to resolve
issues requiring technical expertise.1 3
Arbitration
In arbitration, the parties agree to submit some or all of
their disputes to a neutral third party who is authorized to make a
decision. The results of arbitration may be binding or nonbinding.
Since it is less formal than a traditional courtroom proceeding, the
parties may agree to waive certain formalities, such as strict
adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 4
At least four Superfund cases involving landfills have been
resolved through arbitration. At a site in Hardage, Oklahoma, the
PRPs agreed to use binding arbitration when mediation efforts on
cost allocation failed.15 Binding arbitration was also utilized to
resolve a dispute among a relatively small group of PRPs in
Wauconda, Illinois, where an unpermitted portion of a landfill had
been used for dumping "residential garbage, construction debris, [and]
some industrial sludges and drums with undetermined contents.,1 6
12. Susskind, The Special Master as Environmental Mediator, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10239 (July 1987).
13. Cohen, supra note 7.
14. Id.
15. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. Admin. Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 30132 (Aug. 1988).
The site was located in an agricultural area and had a permit for disposal of
industrial and hazardous wastes other than radioactive material. The State of
Oklahoma filed complaints against the facility for suspected lead poisoning of air
around the site. The site was closed after the state's Department of Health sought
to revoke the facility's license for "operating unpermitted pits, failure to seal
permeable lenses in the pits, improper closure of pits, failure to retain runoff, and
improper storage of wastes." Id.
16. 16 Envtil. L. Rep. Admin. Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 30043 (Mar. 1985).
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Nonbinding arbitration was used at a site, consisting of four
landfills, in Bayou Sorrel, Louisiana.17 Nonbinding arbitration was
also used to remedy a site in LaMarque, Texas, which had been used
to recycle styrene tars and to dispose of industrial chemical wastes,
but was forced to close when a city ordinance was passed prohibiting
disposal of liquid wastes in surface impoundment. Arbitration was
initiated after subsequent owners abandoned attempts to recycle the
wastes in the lagoons.18 A cost-effective remedial option was effected
involving the transport of surface water by pipeline to a treatment
plant, incineration of non-PCB liquid organics, and off-site disposal
of tars, sludges and soils at an approved facility.' 9
Minitrials
Minitrials give parties the opportunity to present their issues
to principals who have the authority to decide the case. They help
parties gain perspective on the strength or weakness of their case,
and allow for a narrowing of factual issues.20 The first time a
minitrial was used in a Superfund case was in United States v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.21 The minitrial resolved a dispute
between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Goodyear over the
allocation of responsibility for cleanup of a hazardous waste site at
Litchfield Park, Arizona. The site, Phoenix-Goodyear Airport, had
17. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. Admin. Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 30131 (Aug. 1988).
Wastes from a nearby injection well were found to contribute to the contamination
at Bayou Sorrel. Following the death of a truck driver at the site, state and federal
regulatory officials inspected the site. The site was ordered closed after the
inspection revealed "unknown materials in large, open, unpermitted ponds" After
arbitration, the site was regraded to control runoff, limit cap erosion, limit surface
water ponding and to divert water from waste areas. Id.
18. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. Admin. Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 30020 (Nov. 1985).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. No. Civ. 88 1443 PHX EHC (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 1988).
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been used by the Navy in 1940.22 The EPA had named both DOD
and Goodyear as PRPs. The Army Corps of Engineers, representing
DOD, sought to avoid litigation and agreed to a minitrial, partially
because the Corps found it difficult to determine the extent of DOD's
responsibility since potential responsibility rested with multiple parties.
The minitrial resulted in an agreement allocating 67% of the costs of
cleanup to Goodyear and 33% of the costs to DOD. The Corps
commented that the agreement "will result in a cooperative effort to
design, construct, and operate a ground water extraction, treatment
and recharge system" at the airport.23
Appropriateness of ADR in the Environmental Law Context
Advocates of ADR vary in their enthusiasm and support for
its application to environmental law. While some view it as a mere
supplement to traditional court processes (e.g., ADR could be used
in negotiating a court ordered settlement), others view it as a means
of resolving disputes by utilizing a system that employs community
values, rather than a rule of law.24
One of the fundamental principles behind alternative dispute
resolution is the opening of communication between parties in dispute
in order to foster a climate of trust.
One lesson that ADR teaches, then, is that processes
designed to restore and build trust can overcome the
suspicion and mutual hostility fostered by the adversary
system and can lead the parties to settle their
differences. When the substantive outcome is compared
to the likely result in court -- and the costs of continued
litigation are weighed in the balance -- both parties
22. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 208 (June 10, 1988).
23. Id.
24. Edwards, supra note 1, at 675-76. Edwards states that an example of this
would be the resolution of simple contract disputes by commercial norms, or
settling minor grievances between neighbors according to local mores. Id.
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generally benefit from ADR.25
Advocates of ADR assert that increased communication
minimizes bluffing and bad faith negotiating, thus allowing parties to
realistically assess whether offers and counter-offers are in good
faith.26 Additionally, ADR is believed to produce superior results to
litigation in that a neutral mediator with subject matter expertise is
frequently employed in these disputes. 27  This same advantage is
unlikely to be available in the courtroom. ADR may not be
appropriate in all types of environmental disputes. Even advocates
of ADR agree that there are contexts in which ADR is inappropriate
or ineffective.
The cases in which ADR will not be desirable
are those that should be tried before a court because:
(1) there are important precedential legal issues that
need resolution; (2) an injunction or other court-
supervised relief is necessary and the parties do not
have the time for or interest in negotiating a consent
decree; or (3) the conduct of one of the parties is so
egregious as to make it in the public interest to subject
that party to the most visible trial and punishment
available. 28
APPLICATION OF ADR TO SUPERFUND
Overview of Superfund
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
25. Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movemen4 '53 U. CHI. L REv. 424, 428-29 (1986). "The adversary process-the
engine of the adjudicatory system-operates on a theory of fundamental distrust:
never put faith in the adversary. Litigation thus becomes formal, tricky, divisive,
time-consuming, and distorting.... In contrast the creation of trust is central to
the design of many ADR processes." Id. at 427.
26. Id. at 430.
27. Id. at 431.
28. Mays, ADR and Environmental Enforcement: Myths, Misconceptions, and
Fallacies, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10099, 10100 (Mar. 1989).
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and Liability Act of 198029 was enacted for the purpose of cleaning
up hazardous waste disposal sites. The Act was revised by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).3 0
CERCLA provides for joint and several liability, and liable PRPs
must either voluntarily cleanup the site themselves (subject to EPA
approval) or pay for the cost through reimbursement to the fund. 1
For the EPA to meet its statutory obligations, millions of dollars
must be appropriated. 2 Advocates of ADR argue that alternative
dispute resolution is a more efficient way to spend public moneys.
Current resources will fund remedial work at
only a fraction of the several thousand sites that are
likely to end up on the NPL. Consequently, the
amended law emphasizes the settlement of Superfund
cases. EPA thus depends upon private party cleanup by
industries under threat of enforcement. In light of these
facts, EPA and a number of commentators have
proposed that alternative means of dispute resolution
be used to breakup the litigation logjam that has been
slowing enforcement and implementation of the
program.33
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
30. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
32. The EPA incurs extensive litigation costs in tracking down all liable PRPs,
and in doing the research necessary to determine the proper cleanup remedy at a
given site. In addition, when PRPs do not voluntarily agree to cleanup a site, the
EPA spends enormous resources in litigating actions for reimbursement to the
fund.
33. Gilbert, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Superfund: A Research Guide,
16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 803, 805 (1989). Gilbert emphasizes here that "although
CERCLA originally had no settlement provisions, SARA added section 122 on
settlement procedures, and section 113 on the right to contribution and
contribution protection. Id. at 805.
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The Use of ADR in CERCLA Settlements
EPA and PRPs
Advocates of ADR suggest that in order for the process to be
effective there must be some equality of bargaining power between
the parties.3 4 Some commentators have suggested that the CERCLA
standard of joint and several liability precludes a balance of power
between the EPA and PRPs. This is due to the fact that "under
section 113(j), a reviewing court will uphold EPA's choice of response
actions unless the objecting party can demonstrate that the EPA was
being arbitrary and capricious. This standard turns dispute resolution
into a government almost always wins provision."
35
In this particular context, however, both sides have incentives
to settle despite the inequality of bargaining power. Speedy resolution
and voluntary cleanup by PRPs saves the EPA time, money, and
extensive litigation. Since EPA resources are limited and subject to
budgetary constraints, the EPA will almost certainly be unable to
fulfill its statutory obligations without voluntary cleanup by the PRPs.
The PRPs have an incentive to settle since they may spend less at the
bargaining table early than after lengthy, and perhaps futile, litigation.
Currently, the EPA is willing to take individual contributions to the
cleanup of a site into consideration when determining the extent of
individual PRP liability. More importantly, the EPA is now
authorized to write into consent decrees contribution protection for
settling PRPs against non-settling PRPs.36  As a result, ADR
34. Riesel, Negotiation and Mediation of Environmental Disputes, 1 OHIO J.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 99, 110 (1985). "Inequality of [bargaining] power does not lend
itself to a negotiated settlement because it discourages the party with power to
avoid meaningful negotiations, and works against the building of trust." Id. at 110.
35. Gaynor, Stipulated Penalties and Dispute Resolution in CERCLA Consent
Decrees: Practical Innovations Can Benefit Everyone, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10155 (May 1988).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2), 9622(h)(4)(1988). "A person who has resolved
its liability to the United States [under this subsection] shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such
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advocates suggest that it is in the PRPs best interests to voluntarily
agree to settle.
Relationship Among PRPs
Advocates of ADR also assert that it can be an effective tool
in apportioning liability for cleanup costs among jointly liable PRPs.37
PRPs have "a strong incentive ... to organize effectively and agree
on a private basis for cost allocation."38 Working together gives PRPs
many advantages. First, it is more efficient for PRPs to clean up
sites themselves than to allow the EPA to conduct cleanups. 39
Second, the EPA and state governments may be more responsive to
a group of PRPs who have joined together to investigate and consider
options for cleanup at a site.40 This allows PRPs to have input in the
selection of the remedial action to be taken at the site.41 By avoiding
extensive litigation with other PRPs, cooperating parties save
tremendous legal fees.42  Mutual cooperation gives PRPs the
opportunity to fully participate in every aspect of the process.
Who Mediates?
Selection of the mediator is one of the most important
settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its
terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount
of the settlement." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(2)(1988).
37. Rennie, Private Facilitating and Adjudicative Functions, 17 Envtl L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10263 (July 1987).
38. Id. at 10264.
39. 1d. When PRPs voluntarily agree to cleanup these sites, they have control
over the processes and means used to achieve this. This saves money; if the EPA
does the cleanup, the PRPs have no control over the amount of money spent.
Additionally, as compared to the EPA, the PRPs often possess superior knowledge
of the site and the nature of the problems. Thus, the PRPs may be the most
efficient and effective party to remedy these problems.
40. Id.
41. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentialty Responsible
Parties: the Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10158
(May 1988).
42. Id. at 10162.
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elements of the negotiation process because of the need to develop
trust and a mutual willingness to work together.43 If the mediator is
unsuccessful in creating and maintaining this type of atmosphere, the
negotiations will often fail. Generally, a neutral mediator with
expertise in the area of the dispute is selected.44 Expertise is
essential, particularly in complex Superfund cases, suggesting that
expertise is one of the principal advantages that ADR provides over
traditional litigation since judges are usually not experts in the
disputes they are deciding.
45
Several organizations now specialize primarily in Superfund
disputes.46 These groups are invited into a case by private parties,
the EPA, or even interested community groups. 47  One of these
organizations, Clean Sites, Inc. (CSI) provides:
all three types of neutral assistance -- facilitation
mediation, and arbitration -- although it is involved most
often as a mediator between PRPs. In addition to
mediating cost allocations, CSI has helped EPA and
responsible parties conduct de minimis buyouts;
organized 700 PRPs to undertake voluntary removal;
mediated a state/PRP agreement on an RI/FS [remedial
investigation/feasibility study]; and arbitrated a mixed
funding settlement.48
CSI asserts that it is often more effective than the EPA in identifying
all liable PRPs due to its sophisticated equipment and computer
capabilities that allow them to do extensive research and fact-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. For a list of these organizations and a summary of their services, see
Gilbert, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Superfund: A Research Guide, 16 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 803, 807-13 (1989).
47. Rennie, supra note 40, at 10264.
48. See Cassell, Negotiating Better Superfund Settlements, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
S117, S159 (1989).
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finding.49
EPA's Policy on CERCLA Settlements
A variety of intricate and technical policy guidance documents
contain the EPA's policy on settlement of CERCLA cases.SO These
documents incorporate several clearly defined principles and goals
that the EPA is committed to follow. The principles and goals
include: 1) A commitment to cleanup as many sites as quickly and
effectively as possible, with the recognition that voluntary cleanups by
PRPs are essential to achieve this objective;51 2) a goal to obtain
complete cleanup by PRPs or 100% of recovery costs, with the
recognition that this can more effectively be obtained through
negotiated settlement than through protracted litigation; 52 3) a goal
to facilitate communication and interaction between the EPA and
PRPs by issuing notice letters, negotiating and sharing information;s3
4) a consideration of settlement proposals for less than 100% of the
cleanup costs, combined with aggressive pursuit of PRPs who are
unwilling to settle through judicial enforcement actions;54 and 5)
consideration of various applications of ADR (nonbinding arbitration
and mediation) to provide opportunities for its use in order to
49. At one site, the EPA had only located 120 PRPs while CSI had already
discovered 275. Id.
50. For a complete list of these documents see Index, Policy Guidance
Documents, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 3500:1 (1990); see also EPA
CERCLA Enforcement Policy Compendium, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
3500:7 (1990).
51. Memorandum: Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. Admin.
Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35050 (Sept. 1987).
52. Id.
53. Memorandum: Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations, and
Information Exchange, 53 Fed. Reg. 5298 (Feb. 23, 1988), 18 Envtl. L. Rep. Admin.
Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35145 (May 1988).
54. Superfund Enforcement Strategy and Implementation Plan, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
Admin. Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35207 (Feb. 1990).
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successfully achieve the established goals.55
EPA's Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution
In addition to the various guidance documents on CERCLA
settlements, in 1987 the EPA set out specific guidelines for the use
of ADR in environmental disputes. The EPA recommended several
situations in which the Agency should consider using dispute
resolution: 5
6
1. Impasse or Potential for Impasse
ADR may be applied when case resolution is prevented because of
personality conflicts, high visibility concerns which make negotiations
difficult, or multiple parties with conflicting interests.
2. Resource Considerations
ADR may be applied when it would achieve resource efficiencies for
the EPA. Such situations generally share the following characteristics:
A. Cases brought in a program area in which the EPA
has considerable experience, and in which the procedures, case
law, or remedies are relatively well-settled and routine; or
B. Cases having a large number of parties or issues
where ADR can be a valuable case management tool.
3. Remedies Affecting Parties not Subject to an
Enforcement Action
ADR may be applied in cases where the remedies affect parties not
subject to an enforcement action (e.g., when citizen's groups or local
governments have expressed an interest, but are not parties to, the
action).57
Theoretically, there should be no obstacles to the successful
55. Id. at 35208.
56. Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in
Enforcement Actions, Envtl. L. Rep. Admin. Materials (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35123 (Jan.
1988).
57. Id. at 35125.
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application of ADR to CERCLA settlement negotiations since the
EPA has officially sanctioned its use and the case law is well settled
regarding liability. Although ADR sounds ideal in theory, the most
important question is whether it works in practice when applied to
CERCLA settlement negotiations.
CRITIQUE OF ADR AND ITS APPLICATION TO SUPERFUND
Saving Time and Money
Saving time and money is often cited as a principal advantage
of ADR. Certain critics do not agree, however, and assert that in
environmental disputes, traditional litigation is actually less costly and
time-consuming because clear rules and precedents are established
which preclude later litigation.58
Multiple Party Interests
Critics of ADR argue that "devices like mediation work best
in simple disputes between two parties, and work poorly in more
complex polycentric disputes among multiple parties."59  It is
extremely difficult to get multiple (sometimes hundreds or thousands)
PRPs to willingly bargain and agree to cleanup a site.6° While a PRP
who is willing to settle may get a better deal at the bargaining table
than through litigation, there is often a sense of unfairness because
the EPA may not have identified all the potentially liable parties at
the site. Due to CERCLA's standard of joint and several liability,
PRPs who are readily identifiable often feel they have no choice but
to settle and to seek some sort of contribution protection from the
EPA.61 This perception of unfairness may hinder the successful
application of ADR from the outset.
58. Brunet, The Costs of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10515, 10516 (Dec. 1988).
59. Id. at 10516.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Conversely, what happens to nonsettling PRPs who may have
good faith reasons for not entering into a voluntary settlement
agreement? "Nonsettlors point out that SARA provides contribution
protection to those who settle with the government .... Nonsettlors
argue that proposed settlements could leave them liable for
uncollected cleanup costs that are out of proportion to their fair
share of those costs."62 Ironically, the settlement process itself has led
to more litigation in that nonsettling PRPs have brought claims that
the settlements "will not exact a fair share of cleanup costs from
settlors".63 The fact that EPA is now statutorily authorized to write
contribution protection into consent decrees presents a whole new set
of questions, including whether or not these settlements violate non-
settlors' due process rights.64 Rather than subverting the traditional
litigation process, settlements achieved through negotiations may
actually increase the amount of litigation.
Fact-Finding
Accurate fact finding is essential to the safe, efficient, and fair
cleanup of a hazardous waste site. In Superfund settlements, the
sharing of information between the EPA and PRPs (and in many
cases with citizen's groups and local governments) is essential to
determine the safe and efficient resolution of these disputes.
Information sharing is one of the clearly defined goals of the EPA.65
Ironically, however, one of the major impediments to achieving
negotiated settlements is the reluctance of the EPA to share
important information with the PRPs.66 This reluctance may be
attributable to typical human reactions to negotiation (i.e., EPA
62. Neuman, No Way Out? The Plight of the Superfund Nonsettlor, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10295, 10295-96 (July 1990).
63. Id.
64. Id at 10296.
65. Supra note 32.
66. Cohen, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10160 (May 1988).
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officials are unwilling to share information out of a fear of giving
away too much, thus losing their superior position over the PRPs).67
Public Perception of the EPA
. Ariother problem facing ADR advocates is the public
perception of the EPA's role in environmental disputes. When
negotiating Superfund settlements, the EPA may be caught between
public perceptions and an effective settlement with PRPs. The PRPs
often view EPA officials as too rigid to negotiate due to CERCLA's
standard of joint and several liability, and EPA's policy of aggressive
enforcement to recover 100% of the cleanup cost.6s Conversely, fear
exists among EPA officials that if they release settling PRPs from
further liability, the public will perceive them as compromising in an
area where there is no need for compromise, since technically "the
government always wins."69
RECOMMENDATIONS
While it is true that there are problems with the application
of ADR to Superfund enforcement both theoretically and
pragmatically, advocates of ADR suggest that many of these problems
can be overcome with minimal efforts by both the EPA and PRPs.70
EPA Initiatives
67. See, Mays, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental Enforcement:
A Noble Experiment or a Lost Cause?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10087,
10090-94 (Mar. 1988). In this article, Mays discusses a variety of "human factors"
that may impede the successful application of ADR.
68. Id. at 10090-92.
69. See, Cassell, Negotiating Better Superfund Settlements, 16 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. S117, S160 (1989). Cassell asserts that EPA officials' reluctance to use ADR
stems in part from misperceptions of ADR, an unwillingness to deviate from
traditional means of resolving disputes, and a fear that the EPA will be perceived
as cutting "sweetheart deals" if they settle with PRPs.
70. Id. at S190-91.
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The number of sites targeted for cleanup on the NPL is
increasing.71 Without voluntary cleanup efforts on the part of liable
PRPs, many of these sites will remain untouched. As a result, ADR
advocates assert that the EPA should make a firm commitment to
seek mediation and negotiation with liable PRPs as the most effective
way to properly cleanup contaminated sites.72 Although it has been
EPA policy to use ADR in these negotiations for several years, there
has been a great deal of reluctance on the part of EPA officials to
use it in practice. The EPA must break the cycle of agency inertia
by providing sufficient training and incentives to encourage regional
offices to use ADR.73
PRP Initiatives
Advocates of ADR suggest several PRP initiatives that can
enhance the settlement process. PRPs must acknowledge that they
will not escape liability for their contributions to hazardous waste
sites. PRPs should realize that it is in their best interests to
voluntarily settle with the EPA and other PRPs. 74 The PRPs can
71. 106 sites were recently added to the National Priority List. 55 Fed. Reg.
35,502 (1990).
72. See supra notes 23, 24.
73. In a recent article, Scott Cassell suggested four ways to aid the EPA in
using ADR in Superfund settlements: facilitated dialogues; negotiation/ADR
training; pilot projects; and demonstration protocols.
Each recommendation is designed to cover an important aspect of
implementation. Facilitated dialogues are meant to allow a forum
for an exchange of ideas and beliefs regarding ADR between
Headquarters and the regions and between EPA and other parties.
Training will teach good negotiating techniques and demonstrate
ADR methods through simulations. Once they have learned and
practiced their skills, officials can test them in pilot projects.
However, to assist negotiators, demonstration protocols will
provide step-by-step guidance for incorporating ADR into the
enforcement process.
Cassell, supra note 69, at S167-S176. In addition, the EPA can improve the
settlement process by more effectively identifying liable PRPs, and by exchanging
valuable information more liberally with the PRPs. Id. at S140-41.
74. Mays, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10087, 10096 (Mar 1988).
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improve their relationship with the EPA and other PRPs by having
their corporations' executives directly involved in the negotiation
process.75 This shows sincerity and a willingness on the part of the
PRPs to make the negotiations work.76 The hiring of a skilled third-
party-neutral could particularly help the PRPs by increasing the
likelihood of locating other liable PRPs.s2 Finally, PRPs should view
settlement as their main objective, and provide the necessary
resources to accomplish this goal.
CONCLUSION
ADR is an extremely important tool for several reasons. First,
it is unlikely that Superfund will be capable of solving our nation's
hazardous waste problems unless the majority of these disputes are
settled through negotiation rather than litigation.83 Many of the ideas
upon which ADR is premised are useful negotiating techniques which
can aid in the settlement process. The various ADR techniques can
be used successfully to work out court ordered settlements. In this
way, ADR can encourage public resolution of these matters.
ADR presents theoretical and pragmatic problems, however,
because public issues are resolved in part by private parties.
Additionally, the EPA's ability to write contribution protection into
consent decrees with settling PRPs may present serious constitutional
questions as to the rights of nonsettling PRPs. Although the concept
of ADR in Superfund enforcement is appealing in theory, the chances
of it being utilized successfully appear to be slim. This is due to the
present reluctance of EPA officials to use ADR, and the PRPs'
fundamental distrust of the settlement process.
75. Id. at 10095.
76. Id. at 10096.
82. Rennie, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10263, 10264 (July 1987).
83. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?,
10 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 8 (1985).
